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DAVID M. SAPP et al., Appellants, Y. ABRAHAM 
BARENFELD et al., Respondents. 
[1] Arbitration and Award-Confirmation of Award-Findings.-
In a proceeding for confirmation of an arbitration aWllrd, 
the findings of the trial court did not support respondents' 
claim that they were wholly denied notice and hearing where 
the court found only that the arbitrators had consulted ex 
parte with a third person as to a specific matter within the 
submission and that respondents were not present at that 
consultation. 
[2] Id.-Con1irmation of Award-Evidence.-In a proceeding for 
confirmation of an arbitration award, the evidence estabhshed 
as untrue an allegation of respondents that the arbitrators 
never held any hearings where respondents' attorney, by let-
ter to the arbitrators, suggested "that the arbitrators and the 
parties meet at the building involved and that the hearings be 
there held"; the arbitrators, pursuant to this suggestion, 
made several tours of inspection of the building, at which tinll'S 
one of the respondents was present and made objections 01' 
took part in the discussion; and it appeared that these touros 
of inspection were for all purposes fair and effective heariTl~s 
that placed no restrictions on respondents' opportunity tu 
advance all relevant claims. 
[3] Id.-Proceedings-Notice of Hearing.-Parties who were pres-
ent at an arbitration hearing and participated therein without 
objection cannot later attack the award because no formlt} 
notice of hearing was given. 
[3] See 3 CaLJur. 62; 3 Am.Jur. 931. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Arbitration, § 5a; [3] Arbitration, 
§ 20; [4-6] Arbitration, § 19; [7,8] Arbitration, § 21.1; [9] Arbi-
tration, § 24; [10] Arbitration, § 26; [11] Arbitration, § 45; [12] 
Al"bitration, § 25; [13,15, 16J Arbitration, § 43; [14] Arbitration, 
i21. 
",. 
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[4] Id.-Proceedings.-Arbitrations are not subject to all rules 
of judicial procedure except those relating to the form of 
questions. . 
[5] Id. - Proceedings. - In arbitration proceedings all relevant 
evidence may be freely aumitteu, and rules of judicial proce-
dure need not be observed so long as the hearing is fairly 
conducted. rfhe hearing may be in the nature of an informal 
conference rather than a judicial trial. 
[6] Id.-Proceedings.-In the absence of express agreement, wit-
nesses need not be sworn in arbitration proceedings. 
[7] Id.-Proceedings-Consultation With Outsiders.-Where ar-
bitrators have determined from disputed questions of fact 
that the reconstruction work involved did not conform to the 
specifications, the award was the result of the arbitrators' 
own judgment although based on information acquired by 
consulting ex parte a skilled cost appraiser, and checking 
his estimate with several building supply firms. 
[8] Id.-Proceedings-Consultation With Outsiders.-Although a 
hearing is required on disputed questions of fact, arbitrators 
may inform themselves further by privately consulting price 
lists, examining materials and receiving cost estimates. This 
procedure may be ex parte, without notice or hearing to the 
parties, and it is immaterial whether the subject of the ap-
praisal is the only matter in dispute or is part of a broader 
submission. 
[9] Id.-Award-Requisites.-Where arbitrators found that con-
tractors failed to conform to the specifications in several in-
stances in reconstructing a building and made an award to 
them after deducting the cost of the work necessary to remedy 
the defects, the fact the arbitrators failed to make an express 
finding in the award on the owners' claim of damages for 
delay in completion of the building did not invalidate the 
award, since arbitrators are not required to find facts or to 
give reasons for their awards. (Disapproving Muldrow V. 
Norris, 12 Cal. 331, 339.) 
[10] Id.-Award-Finality-Determining All Matters.-Where a 
dispute arose over the alleged failure of contractors to per-
form construction work according to the specifications and to 
finish it on time, and this dispute was submitted to arbitra-
tion, a decision of the arbitrators simply that one of the par-
ties should pay the other a sum of money was sufficiently 
determinative of all items embraced in the submission. 
[11] 1.1. - Award~Vacation-Impeachment--Evidence.-The affi-
daViL of an arbitrator is admissible to prove the arbitrators' 
failure to consider the item of damage from delay in complet-
ing the work in question, for although an arbitrator cannot im-
peach an award by testifying to his fraud or misconduct, his 
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testimony is admissible to show what matters were submitted 
for decision and were considered by thc arbitrators. 
[12] Id.-Award-Scopc.-Unless specifically required to act in 
conformity with rules of law, arbitrators may base their de-
cision on broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing 
so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might 
successfully have asserted in a judicial action. 
[13] Id.-Award-Vacation.-Where a claim in the submission 
to arbitration can only be implied from the facts alleged, the 
arbitrators' failure to consider it is only an error of judgment 
that, in the absence of fraud or gross misconduct, is not sub-
ject to judicial review. 
[14] Id. - Proceedings - Evidence.-Where an arbitration agree-
ment does not expressly submit the issue of damages resulting 
from delay in completing a building, but merely states that 
a dispute arose as to whether the contractors complied with 
the specifications without alleging damage suffered thereby, 
the arbitrators are not required to consider the item of dam-
ages for delay unless they are presented with evidence on 
which a computation of damages could be based. 
[16] Id.-Award-Vacation.-A party who asserts a claim in an 
arbitration proceeding must produce evidence in support of 
that claim; if he fails to do so, he cannot attack the award 
on the ground that the claim was not considered by the ar-
bitrators. 
[16] Id.-Award-Vacation.-Where a dispute as to alleged fail-
ure of contractors to perform construction work according to 
specifications was submitted to arbitration, but the owners 
failed at the several hearings to introduce any evidence of 
the loss of rental income, althougb they had ample oppor-
tunity to do so, and such claim was first expressly asserted 
by affidavits in opposition to a petition for confirmation of an 
award to the contractors, the al'bitrators' failure to consider 
these damages could not invalidate the award. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County vacating an award of arbitrators. Allen W. 
Ashburn, Judge. Reversed. 
Laurence J. Rittenband and Leo Jay }(.oss for Appellants. 
Knight, Gitelson & Ashton and Alfred Gitelson for Re-
spondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-' On December 31, 1946, appellants con-
tracted to reconstruct a building owned by respondents that 
had been damaged by fire. I t was agreed that appellants were 
... 
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to restore the building to the condition it was in immediately 
before the fire in accord with the original plans and specifica-
tions. Work was to begin within 15 days and to be completed 
within 18l) days thereafter. Any dispute arising under the 
contract was to be submitted to arbitration. A dispute arose 
over the alleged failure of the appellants to perform the work 
according to the specifications and to finish it on time. Appel-
lants denied these allegations and sought additional compen-
sation under the contract for extra work performed. On Sep-
tember 2, 1947, the parties agreed in writing to submit their 
dispute to arbitratIon. Respondents and appellants ea.ch 
appointed one arbitrator and these two selected a third. All 
three were qualified a.rchitects. On November 19, 1947, the 
arbitrators rendered a unanimous opinion, finding that appel-
lants had failed to conform to the specifications in several in-
stances. After deducting the cost of the work necessary to 
remedy the defects from the balance due appellants under the 
contract, the arbitrators made an award of $6,966.45 to appel-
lants. Pursuant to section 1287 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, appellants petitioned the superior court for an order 
confirming the award. Respondents contested the petition 
and moved to vacate the award under sections 1288 (c) and (d) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. After a hearing on affidavits, 
the tria] court found (1) that "Said arbItrators were guilty 
of misconduct in that they based their award in a large part 
upon informntion procured ex parte {rom third persons, with 
no notice to the parties hereto that they intended to adopt 
such a procedure, and gaye the parties hereto no opportunity to 
cross-examine such third persons" and (2) that "Said arbi-
trators so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, 
final and definite award, upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made, in that said arbitrators failed to pass upon re-
spondents Barenfelds' claim for damages for delay in com-
pleting the building which was the subject of the contro-
versy." The court entered an order vacating the award, and 
this appeal followed. 
Appellants do not contend that the trial court's findings of 
fact are not supported by substanticl evidence. They admit 
that those findings are supported by the evidence and are 
therefore conclusive on this appeal. The finality of the court's 
findings of fact cannot, however, be extended to the legal con-
clusions it derives therefrom, aHd if those conclusions are 
incorrect, as appellants assert, the judgment must be reversed. 
[1] The findings of the t.ria] court do not support respond-
) 
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ents' broad assertions that they were demed notice and hear-
ing. The court found only that the arbitrators bad I.'onsulted 
ex parte with a third person as to a specIfic matter within the 
submission and that respondents were not present at that 
consultation. This finding lends no support to respondents' 
contention that they were wholly denied notice and hearmg 
and that the trial court so found. 
[2] The evidence in fact clearly establishes that the arbi-
trators did hold informal hearings, at each of which the 
respondents were present and vigorously prosecuted their 
claims, presenting evidence in support thereof. Respondents' 
affidavits contradict their allegations that they were denied 
a hearing and indicate clearly that they were afforded ample 
opportunity to present their claims to the arbitrators. Although 
respondents allege that, as far as they know, the arbitrators 
never held any hearings, the evidence conclusively establishes 
that this allegation is untrue. Respondents' attorney, by 
letter to the arbitrators, suggest~d ,. that the arbitrators and 
the parties meet at the building involved and that the hear-
ings be there held." Pursuant to thi:' suggestion, the arbi-
trators made a tour of inspection of the building on Septem-
ber 23, 1947, at which time Abraham Barenfeld was present. 
Barenfeld states in his affidavit that, on that inspection, he 
accompanied the arbitrators and "From time to time as we 
walked through I would point out objections to various items 
in the building which had been either improperly constructed 
or not constructed at all by the petitioners." Another tour 
of inspection was conducted on October 9, 1947, Abraham 
Barenfeld being again present together with one of the Sapps. 
Both parties actively participated in the discussion of the al-
h.·ged defects, and respondent ., again stated various objections 
to the arbitrators that 1 had to the work of construction by the 
petitioners which 1 had not mentioned on their first' visit. " 
'fhe arbitrators made a final tour of inspection on October 21, 
1947. Jack Barenfeld admits that he was present at that time 
and "pointed out to them numerous items in the building 
which had been either improperly constructed or not con-
structed at all. " 
There is no evidence that any other hearings were held. 
There is clear and uncontradicted evidence, supported by the 
affidavits of the respondents, that these tours of inspection 
were for all purposes fair and effective hearings that placed 
no restriction upon respondents' opportunity to advance all 
) 
520 SAPP V. BARENFELD [34 C.2d 
relevant claims. [3] Since respondents were present at each 
of the hearings and participated therein without objection, 
they cannot attack the award because no formal notice of hear-
ing was given .. " If a party appears aild participates without 
objection in arbitral proceedings . . . such party cannot later 
object to the award . . . on the ground that he did not have 
notice of the hearing . . . This is true, it was held, although 
formal notice of the hearing was expressly stipulated for in 
a submission agreement." (Sturges, Commercial Arbitration 
and Awards, § 152, pp. 382-383; Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. 
Co. v. Roussell, 155 Ala. 435 [46 So. 866, 130 Am.St.Rep. 56 J ; 
Acme Lumber Co. v. Ruby, 237 Mich. 314, 316 [211 N.W. 
631] ; Mississippi Cotton Oil Co. v. Buster, 84 Miss. 91 [36 So. 
146, 147] ; Jacob v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 136 Ore. 622, 
639 [297 P. 848J; Canuso v. Philadelphia, 326 Pa. 302, 307 
[192 A. 133] ; see 6 Am.Jur., Arbitration & Award, § 104.) 
[4] Respondents, however. apparently contend that the 
tours of inspection were not valid hearings for the reason 
that they were not conducted with the formalities of a judicial 
hearing. This contention is exemplified by the affidavit of 
respondents' attorney "That at aU times concerned it was 
and now is your affiant's opinion that arbitrations are to be 
conducted in the same manner and with the same formalities, 
excepting only technical objections as to questions, that a 
trial in a court is required to be conducted." It has never 
been the law that arbitrations are subject to all rules of 
judicial procedure save those relating to the form of questions. 
"The essence of arbitration is its freedom from the formality 
of ordinary judicial procedure." (Oanuso v. Philadelphia, 
326 Pa. 302, 307 [192 A. 133].) [5] All relevant evidence may 
be freely admitted and rules of judicial procedure need not 
be observed so long as the hearing is fairly conducted. The 
hearing may be in the nature of an informal conference 
rather than a judicial trial. (Dana v. Dana, 260 Mass. 460, 
464 [157 N.E. 623J; Modern System Bakery v. Salisbury, 
215 Ky. 230, 236 [284 S:W. 994J; Jacob v. Pacific Export 
Lu,mber Co., 136 Ore. 622, 637, 645 [297 P. 848] ; Brodhead-
Garret Co. v. Davis Lumber Co., 97 W.Va. 165, 169, 172 [124 
S.E. 600].) [6] Respondents repeatedly stress the fact that 
witnesses were not sworn, but in the absence of express agree-
ment there is no requirement that they be sworn. (Matter 
of Silliman, 159 Cal. 155, 158 [113 P. 135] ; Hano v. Isaac H. 
Blanchard Co., 199 N.Y.S. 227, 230.) "Arbitration mayor 
may not be a desirable substitute for trials in courts j as 
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to that the parties must decide in each instance. But when 
they have adopted it, they must be content with its informali-
ties; they may not hedge it about with those procedural limita-
tions which it is precisely its purpose to avoid." (American 
Almond Products 00. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., Inc., 
144 F.2d 448, 451.) 
[7] The disputed questions of fact were determined by 
the arbitrators on the basis of the claims and evidence adduced 
at the hearings. Having determined therefrom that the work 
in some respects did not conform to the specifications, the arbi-
trators, to determine the amount of the award, consulted px 
parte with C. L. Weeks, a skilled cost appraiser, for an f'sti-
mate of the labor and material cost of remedying the defects. 
They checked his estimate with severa] building supply firms 
and adopted it in making their award after this independent 
investigation. The award was the result of the arbitrators' 
own judgment, based, however, on information acquired in 
this manner. 
There is no error in such procedure. [8] Although a hear- . 
ing is required on disputed questions of fact, arbitrators may 
inform themselves further by privately consulting price lists, 
examining materials and receiving cost estimates. (Sturges, 
Commercial Arbitration and A wards, § 217, p. 495.) This 
procedure may be ex parte, without notice or hearing to the 
parties, for "it is entirely proper for arbitrators, in a case 
requiring it, to obtain from disinterested persons of at.!knowl-
edged skill s1lch information and advice in reference to techni-
cal questions submitted to them, as may be necessary to 
enable them to come to correct conclusions, provided that 
the award is the result of their own judgment after obtaining 
such information." (1 Mechem, Agency, § 310, p. 229; Omaha 
v. Omaha Water 00., 218 U.S. 180, 198 [30 S.Ct. 615, 54 L.Ed. 
991] ; Oalifornia Annual Conf. of M. E. Ohurch v. Seitz, 74 
Cal. 287, 295 [15 P. 893]; Dare v. Southern Pac. Co., 163 
Cal. 182, 189 [124 P. 817] ; Simons v. Mills, 80 Cal. 118, 120 
[22 P. 25] ; Foster v. Oarr, 135 Cal. 83, 86 [67 P. 43] ; Rives-
Strong Bldg., Inc. v. Bank of America, 50 Cal.App.2d 810, "'. 
814-817 [123 P.2d 942] ; Gord v. Harmon & 00., 188 Wash. 134, 
140 [61 P.2d 1294] ; Liggett v. Torrington Bldg. Co., 114 Conn. 
425, 432 [158 A. 917] ; Koepke v. E. Liethen Grain Co., 205 
Wis. 75, 77 [236 N.W. 544] ; Twin Lakes Reservoir &: Canal 
00. v. Platt Rogers, Inc., 112 Colo. 155 [147 P.2d 828] ; Bangor 
Savings Bank v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 85 Me. 68, 76-77 [26 
A.. 991, 35 Am.St.Rep. 341].) It is immaterial whether the 
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subject of the appraisal is the only matter in dispute or is 
part of a broader submission. (Gord v. Harmon & Co., supra; 
llegeburg v. New Engla'lld Fish Co., 7 'Vn.2d 509 [110 P.2d 
182] ; Bangor Savmgs Bank v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., supra; 
Sturges, supra, § 217, pp. 495-498.) It is not true, as re-
spondents assert, that the foregoing eases are distinguishable 
on the ground that the submission agreements contemplated 
that the arbitrators should be allowed to resort to these addi-
tional sources of information. An examination of these cases 
reveals that hearings on disputed questions of fact wer~ ex-
pressly or impliedly required and were actually held. III 
each of these cases, however, resort to these additional sources 
of information was held to be authorized by the nature of 
the dispute, not by the terms of the submission agreement. 
(Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 198 [30 S.Ct. 615, 
54 L.Ed. 991]; American Almond Products Co. v. Consoli-
dated Pecan Sales Co., Inc., 144 F.2d 448, 450.) 8tockwelL 
v. Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 134 Cal.App. 534 [25 
P.2d 873], relied upon by respondents, is not controlling here .. 
In that case, the failure to accord plaintiff a hearing was part 
of a fraudulent and collusive agreement between the arbi-
trators to undervalue plaintiff's property, and the award was 
vacated for that reason. 
rrhe arbitrators were chosen for their technical qualifica. 
tions. As experts, they could determine construction costs 
from their own experience, or enlist the aid of a trained ap-
praiser in determining the amount of the award. Respondents 
were not denied a hearing on any issue on which the law gives 
them a right to be heard. 
[9] As an alternative ground for vacating the award, the 
trial court found that it was not mutual, final, 3.lld definite 
because the arbitrators did not consider respondents' claim of 
damages for the delay in completion of the building. The fail-
ure to make an express finding in the award on that claim 
does not invalidate the award. "There is no general rule that 
arbitrators must find facts and give reasons for their awards. 
In fact, the rule and general practice is to the contrary." 
(Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. 8. T., Ltd., 29 Cal.2d 228, 
232 [174 P.2d 441]; Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page, 92 
Cal.App.2d 448, 451-452 [207 P.2d 647]; In re Connor, 
128 Cal. 279, 282 [60 P. 862] ; Dugan v. Phillips, 77 Cal.App. 
268, 278 [246 P. 566] ; Bank of Coronado v. 8hreve, 51 Cal. 
App. 353, 357 [196 P. 787].) The dictum to the contrary in 
Muldrow v. Norris, 12 Cal. 331, 339, relied upon by respond· 
) 
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ents, is no longer controlling in view of the foregoing decisions 
and is disapproved. [10] The award is valid if it serves to 
settle the entire controversy. A decision simply that one of 
the parties should pay the other a sum of money is sufficiently 
determinative of all items embraced in the submission. (Ful-
more v. McGeorge, 91 Cal. 611, 615-616 [28 P. 92] ; Dugan v. 
Phillips, 77 Cal.App. 268, 278 [246 P. 566] ; Rice v. Hassen-
pflug,45 Ohio St. 377 l13 N.E. 655].) 
[11] To prove the arbitrators' failure to consider the item 
of damage from the delay in completion, respondents intro-
duced the affidavit of the arbitrat9r whom they had appointed, 
Maurice Fleishman. Appellants' contention that Fleishman's 
affidavit was inadmissible as tending to impeach his award 
cannot be upheld. Although an arbitrator cannot impeach 
the award by testifying to his fraud or misconduct, his testi-
mony is admissible to show what matters were submitted for 
decision and were considered by the arbitrators. (Giannopu-
los v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442 [15 P.2d 353] ; Osborne v. Colvert, 
86 N.C. 170, 171; Sturges, Commercial Arbitration and 
Awards, § 365, p. 786.) The trial court found that the item 
had not been considered by the arbitrators in making their 
award. This finding, however, does not support the conclusion 
of the trial court that the award was invalid. 
[12] Even though a party expressly asserts a lawful claim 
in the submission or raises it by the presentation of evidence 
to the arbitrators, the law does not guarantee that the claim 
will be allowed. Arbitrators, unless specifically required to 
act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision 
upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so 
may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might 
successfully have asserted in a judicial action. (Gerdetz v. 
Central Oregon Irr. 00.,83 Ore. 576, 580 [163 P. 980J ; Ever-
ett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349 [198 N.Y.S. 462, 465] ; Koepke 
v. E. Liethen Grain Co., 205 Wis. 75, 80 [236 N.W. 544].) 
The claim must be expressly raised at some time before the 
award. [13] If it can only be implied from the facts alleged, 
the failure to consider it is only an error of judgment that in 
the absence of fraud or gross misconduct is not subject to ju-
dicial review. "Even if the omission to find as to those items 
was due to a mistake on the part of the arbitrators, nevertheless 
the omission was·in effect a disallowance of those items, 
which became final and conclusive when the award was made 
and proper notice thereof given to the interested parties." 
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(Koepke v. E. Liethen Grain Co., 205 Wis. 75, 80 [236 N.W. 
544] ; Carsley v. Lindsay, 14 Cal. 390, 394; Montifiori v. En-
gels,3 Cal. 431, 434; Glesby v. Balfoura G'ltthrie & Co., 63 Cal. 
App.2d 414, 417 [147 P.2d 60].) 
[14] The arbitration agreement in the present ~ase did 
not expressly submit to the arbitrators the issue of damages re-
sulting from delay in completing the building. Paragraph 5 
of the construction contract required completion within 180 
days, but made no provision for reduction of the total contract 
price or payment of liquidated damages in the event of a 
breach. The submission to arbitration stated only that" Baren-
felds contend that the said Sapps did not comply with the pro-
visions of paragraph (5)," without alleging damage suffered 
thereby. Proof that a contract has been broached is not suffi-
cient to entitle a party to damages for the breach without 
proof that damage has been suffered. The arbitrators were 
not required to consider the item of damages for failure to 
complete the construction within 180 days unless they were 
presented with evidence upon which a computation of dam-
ages could be based. [15] A party who asserts a claim'in an 
arbitration proceeding must produce evidence in support of 
that claim; if he fails to do so, he cannot attack the award 
on the ground that the claim was not considered by the ar-
bitrators. (Montifiori v. Engels, 3 Cal. 431, 434.) [16] Al-
though the undisputed facts show that they had ample oppor-
tunity, respondents failed at any of the several hearings to 
introduce any evidence of the loss of rental income which 
they now claim. The first time that the claim was expressly 
asserted was by the affidavits in opposition to the petition for 
confirmation of the award. Under these circumstances the 
determination of damages would be but a legal conclusion 
that the arbitrators might have drawn from the facts found. 
The failure to consider these damages cannot invalidate the 
award. (In re Connor, 128 Cal. 279, 281-282 [60 P. 862] ; 
Carsley v. L1:ndsay, 14 Cal. 390, 394.) 
The order vacating the award and denying the application 
for confirmation of the award is reversed with directions to 
enter an order confirming the award. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-Admittedly the evidence supports the trial 
court's findings of fact; those findings, reasonably construed 
) 
in favor of the judgment, adequately support it. By the rules 
of law which heretofore have generally been respected by 
appellate courts the judgment should be affirmed. 
The opinion and judgment were modified to read as above 
on December 13,1949. 
